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Abstract
This paper discusses the rise of a fundamental issue in Dutch
criminal proceedings. The presence of a lawyer prior to and
during police interrogations has for a long time been a
matter open for debate in the Netherlands. Allowing legal
assistance during and prior to police interrogations has been
researched on several occasions in the previous century and
the beginning of this century. In the Netherlands, one of the
most important reasons for not admitting legal assistance
was and is founded in the confident reliance on the profes-
sionalism and integrity of police officers and justice officials
in dealing with the interests of suspects. However, after the
Salduz case (ECHR 27 November 2008, Appl. No. 36391/
02, Salduz v. Turkey), the Dutch government was compell-
ed to draft legal provisions in order to facilitate legal assis-
tance during and prior to police interrogations. The initial
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drafts still contained a hesitant approach on admitting the
lawyer to the actual interrogation. The EU-Directive of
November 2013 (Pb EU 2013, L249) set out further reach-
ing standards compelling the Dutch government to create
new drafts. In a ruling of April 2014, the Dutch Supreme
Court (ECLI:NL:2014:770) argued that the judgements of
the ECtHR were too casuistic to derive an absolute right to
have a lawyer present during police interrogation. However,
they urged the legislator to draft legislation on this matter
and warned that its judgement in this could be altered in
future caused by legal developments. The Dutch legislator
already proposed new draft legislation in February. In this
paper it is examined whether the provisions of the new
drafts meet the standards as set out in the EU-Directive as
well as by the ECtHR.
Keywords: Legal assistance, police interrogation, Dutch
Criminal Proceedings, EU Directive
1 Introduction and Context:
The Rise of a Fundamental
Issue in Dutch Criminal
Procedure Law and the
Reasons behind This
Developments in the field of legal assistance prior to,
during, and after interrogation by the police can be per-
ceived as the most turbulent and radical change in
Dutch Criminal Proceedings of the past years. There
are several reasons for this. First of all, Dutch Criminal
Proceedings have no tradition in providing the suspect
or the accused with protection in the form of legal assis-
tance based on a thoroughly regulated system prior to,
during, and after police interrogation. Instead, there is
and has been a confident reliance on the professionalism
and integrity of police officers and justice officials in
dealing with the interests of the suspect and the
accused. Although the notification of a (standby) lawyer
has been required for some time when a suspect or an
accused person is detained in police custody, this has
never generally been considered necessary for safe-
guarding the rights of the suspect or the accused person
prior to, during, or after the interrogation. There was
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therefore no rule stating that the arrival of a lawyer had
to be awaited before interrogation could commence or
that the suspect or accused person should have contact
with his lawyer. In general, the assumption was that the
professionalism and integrity of interrogating officers
was satisfactory as far as the just and complete reflection
of the statements made by the suspect or accused person
in official reports was concerned1 and as far as ill-
treatment or mistreatment of the suspect or accused was
concerned. Legal assistance during interrogation was
not considered necessary for these guarantees. For the
same reasons, the consultation of a lawyer prior to the
first interrogation to ensure the suspect or the accused
was informed of his rights during the interrogation was
also not considered necessary. In other words, it is the
interrogating officer (himself) who is obliged to miran-
dize the suspect or the accused regarding the right to
remain silent during interrogation. Against this back-
ground, legal developments to strengthen guarantees of
legal assistance prior to or during interrogation were,
and perhaps are still, all too soon interpreted as an
unjust sign of distrust towards police criminal investiga-
tors. This also explains why the first suggestions by the
Council of Europe, that the Dutch rules offer too few
guarantees in the field of legal assistance to the suspect
or the accused prior to and during interrogations, were
not taken very seriously by the police nor by the govern-
ment. As early as 1991 further to the identification of
(alleged) mistreatment during police interrogations, for
example, in France, the first suggestions that these
guarantees are weak were made by the CPT. In the
Netherlands, however, the CPT’s findings were soon
labelled as ‘soft law’, which is not compulsory as far as
amending Dutch law is concerned, even more so when
this soft law regards the ‘freedom’ of police to inter-
rogate suspects or accused persons upon arrest without
too much concern about safeguarding their rights to
legal assistance: a ‘freedom’ embedded in Dutch legal
culture. The danger of mistreatment during police
interrogation was, presumably with good reason, not
considered as the biggest threat to the suspect or the
accused. This explains why the Dutch government ini-
tially rejected all calls to recognise the right to the pres-
ence of a lawyer during police interrogation that were
formulated by the CPT in,inter alia, its reports on visits
to the Netherlands in 1992 and 1997.2 Nevertheless, the
CPT had touched upon an issue that every now and
then was the subject of debate about criminal procedure
law in the Netherlands.
This restrained attitude of the Netherlands towards the
right to legal assistance prior to and during police inter-
rogation, as developed by the Council of Europe, only
started to change when this right became grounded in
the rulings of the European Court of Human Rights
1. As stated in Art. 152 CPC, police officers have to relate in police reports
on criminal offences they detect or on acts they performed in order to
detect the criminal offence.
2. C.J.C.F. Fijnaut, Het vooronderzoek in strafzaken. Tweede interim-
rapport onderzoeksproject strafvordering (2001), at 703.
(ECtHR),3 making it more influential and thus inevita-
ble for Dutch practice and regulations in the field of
criminal procedure law. After a number of initial cases
pointing towards this right such as Can v. Austria, S. v.
Switzerland, Imbrioscia v. Switzerland, Murray v. the
United Kingdom, Selmouni v. France, and Condron a.o. v.
the United Kingdom, on 27 November 2008, the Grand
Chamber of the European Court pronounced its ruling
in the case of Salduz v. Turkey.4 Two aspects of this rul-
ing are of particular interest.5 The guarantee of legal
assistance prior to and during police interrogation is
placed within the scope of ‘the prevention of miscarriag-
es of justice’ and ‘the fulfillment of the aims of Article 6,
notably equality of arms between the investigating or
prosecuting authorities and the accused’, as, under ref-
erence to the earlier reports and approach of the CPT, a
‘safeguard against ill-treatment’. Secondly, the Grand
Chamber explicitly commented on the legal consequen-
ces of violating these rights: ‘The rights of the defence
will in principle be irretrievably prejudiced when
incriminating statements made during police interroga-
tion without access to a lawyer are used for a convic-
tion’. In other words, any statement made by a suspect
or accused person during police interrogation, and dur-
ing which his rights relating to this specific point were
violated, are inadmissible as evidence. An international
court ruling on the use of evidence in criminal cases,
based on an international treaty on guarantees in crimi-
nal proceedings, is regarded rather extensively. Only in
obvious cases of torture (UN Convention against Tor-
ture) as well as violations of Article 3 of the ECHR can
the first steps in this be found.6 The immediate effect of
ECtHR rulings is relevant to the Netherlands. The
Salduz ruling is interesting because of the above two
aspects regardless of whether or not this ruling can be
interpreted as establishing a right for an adult suspect or
accused to the presence of a lawyer during police inter-
rogation. Nonetheless, the Dutch government was faced
with the challenge of complying with the ECtHR’s
approach. However, before discussing the Dutch
response, some other developments need to be outlined.
As stated, neither the need to protect the suspect or
accused person against ill-treatment nor the need to fur-
ther detail the ‘equality of arms’ deriving from Article 6
of the ECHR was enough to bring about change in
existing Dutch legislation or practice. Such change was
even not deemed necessary after the emergence of indi-
vidual cases in which interrogation methods violated or
came close to violating the suspect’s or accused’s right
3. On the basis of the Dutch Constitution, the binding treaty provisions of
international treaties and decisions of international organisations such as
the ECtHR have direct effect within the Dutch criminal justice system; in
addition, they take precedence over any possible conflicting provisions
of national law.
4. ECHR 27 November 2008, Appl. No. 36391/02, Salduz v. Turkey,
ECLI:NL:HR:BH0402.
5. ECHR 27 November 2008, Appl. No. 36391/02, Salduz v. Turkey,
§§ 50-55.
6. See the clause concerned in ECHR 30 June 2008, Appl. No. 22978/05,
Gäfgen v. Germany, Grand Chamber.
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to remain silent.7 Initially the same applied with regard
to preventing miscarriages of justice. However, this
changed when the Netherlands was confronted with
some cases involving miscarriages of justice that
attracted significant media attention. Specifically, the
mistakes made in the preliminary investigation in the
case known as the ‘Schiedammer parkmoord’ led to the
initiation in July 2008 of a biennial experiment ‘raads-
man bij verhoor’8 following the adoption by parliament
of Dittrich’s9 resolution and the programme ‘Enforcing
Investigation and Prosecution’ designed to optimise
truth finding in criminal cases.10 The Salduz approach
of the ECtHR clearly resounds in the choice for and
continuing of this apparently truth-finding self-explana-
tory experiment. The contents and significance of this
ruling have, albeit hesitantly and contrary to the Dutch
tradition of regulations and police interrogations,
increased and eased acceptance of the modality of a
lawyer being present during police interrogation.
The ruling in the Salduz case indeed took on such
importance for the regulation and practice of legal
representation surrounding the police interrogation that
it became necessary to amend regulations and practice.
This was done at three levels. The criminal division of
the Dutch Supreme Court, ‘de Hoge Raad der Ne-
derlanden’, made a guiding decision on the consequen-
ces of the Salduz case for the Netherlands in June
2009.11 In this case, the Supreme Court decided that the
ECtHR rulings implied that a suspect or accused
detained by the police has the right to legal assistance,
i.e., he should be offered the opportunity to communi-
cate with a lawyer prior to his interrogation by the
police. However, it was also decided that these rulings
did not imply the right to the presence of a lawyer dur-
ing the interrogation itself.12 The first part of the deci-
sion of the Supreme Court applies to adults under crim-
inal law as well as minors under criminal law (in the
Netherlands: younger than 18 years). However, the
assumption was made that according to the European
jurisprudence, minors under criminal law also have the
right to be assisted by a lawyer or other confidant during
police interrogation.13
The decision not to allow a lawyer to be present during
interrogation was confirmed by the Supreme Court
even a few months after the Directive (to be discussed
later). This Directive which regards the right of access
to a lawyer during criminal proceedings and the right to
communicate upon arrest was adopted by the European
7. In a general sense see Fijnaut, above n. 2, at 741 and T. Blom, ‘Vormen
verzuimd tijdens het politieverhoor’, Inauguration, University of Amster-
dam, Vossius UvA, Amsterdam (2010).
8. L. Stevens and W.J. Verhoeven, Raadsman bij politieverhoor, The
Hague (2010).
9. Motion of 25 October 2006, Parliamentary Papers II, 2006-2007,
30800 VI, No. 14.
10. Programma Versterking Opsporing en Vervolging, November 2005.
11. ECLI:NL:HR:2009:BH3079; see also detailed Opinion of the Advocate-
General at the Supreme Court, ECLI:NL:PHR:2009:BH3079.
12. ECLI:NL:HR:2009:BH3079, para. 2.5.
13. ECLI:NL:HR:2009:BH3079, para. 2.6.
Union.14 This verdict underlines the restrained Dutch
approach of the presence of a lawyer during police inter-
rogations.
In this particular case, the Dutch Supreme Court found
motives to recognise the right to have a lawyer present
during police interrogation neither in the Navone and
others v. Monaco case15 nor in the above-mentioned
Directive. These findings were, in short, justified by
two important arguments. The first argument stated by
the Supreme Court was the argument that despite the
fact that the Directive was adopted by the European
Union, implementation of this Directive is set to take
effect on 27 November 2016 and therefore explicitly not
entered into force, thus accepting that certain Member
States currently do not meet the terms set out in the
Directive.16 The other argument was that the Supreme
Court notices that, at the time of the verdict, no such
regulations existed, due to the lack of a legal regulation
regarding this part of the mentioned Directive. The
Dutch Supreme Court, bearing the political and policy
considerations as well as the organisational and financial
aspects in mind, added that creating a general regulation
regarding legal assistance during police interrogation
would exceed its judicial function.17
In Dutch criminal law practice, it is the police who is
responsible for executing the interrogation of the sus-
pect or accused under the authority of the public prose-
cutor in charge of the investigation. The heads of the
Public Prosecution and/or the Ministry of Security and
Justice supervise this in the form of guidelines and
directives that should be followed as a rule. Politically
the Minister of Security and Justice is held responsible
for the substance of these guidelines and directives.
Within this context, the public prosecutors’ ‘Guidelines
for legal assistance and police interrogation’ came into
effect on 1 April 2010.18 These guidelines determine
how the issue of legal assistance prior to the first police
interrogation should be dealt with.19
The above developments relating to legal assistance also
called for legislative amendments of the Dutch Penal
Code. Decisions that are too political or that influence
the very core of the Dutch system of criminal proceed-
ings have to be made by parliamentary legislation. The
principle of legality that applies to criminal procedure
law also requires this. In the Netherlands it is not
uncommon for the Ministry of Security and Justice, as
the initiating party when it comes to legislation, to pub-
lish a proposed legislative amendment, a so-called 'draft
bill', and present this for legally qualified debate and
commentary whilst requesting several official institutes,
such as the public prosecutor or the judiciaries for
14. Directive 2013/48/EU, 22 October 2013, Pb EU L249.
15. Navone and others v. Monaco, 24 October 2013, Nos. 62880/11,
62892/11 and 62899/11.
16. ECLI:NL:HR:2014:770, paras. 2.5.2.
17. ECLI:NL:HR:2014:770, paras. 2.5.3.
18. Instructions regarding legal assistance in relation to police interrogation
(2010A007), Government Gazette, 2010, No. 4003.
19. For a detailed report of the evaluation of the guidelines in practice, see
Stevens and Verhoeven, above n. 8.
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advice. A final bill is then drafted based on the
comments and advice to be presented to parliament. On
22 March 2011, the Dutch legislator presented a first
draft bill on legal assistance and police interrogation.20
The absence of a tradition with the presence of a lawyer
was reflected by the first proposal. The rights to com-
municate with a lawyer and to have him present during
interrogation by police were limited by many thresh-
olds. It was thus not surprising that the first draft bill
was regarded redundant, when the Directive, Pb EU
2013, L 294, founded on – amongst others – the verdict
in the Salduz case,21 was adopted by the EU.22
As a result of the content of the Directive, the initial
presented draft bill has been altered and divided into
two draft bills.23 One draft bill provides only the neces-
sary components to implement the wordings and rights
of the Directive, Pb EU 2013, L 294, which next to the
right to access to a lawyer entails the right to appoint a
lawyer in a Member State as a part of European Arrest
Warrant proceedings, as well as the possibility for a sus-
pect to inform a third party of the deprivation of liberty
and to communicate with a third party and consular
authorities. The other draft bill complements the regu-
lations of the Dutch Criminal Procedure regarding the
first phase of the investigative procedures in a criminal
case. This supplement contributes to integrating the
access to a lawyer, as created by the Directive, in the
Criminal Procedures as a part of the investigative proce-
dures.
The initially proposed, later-changed draft bill24 already
contained a few aspects of particular interest. It pro-
posed adding new rules to the Criminal Code which
were supposed to make it possible for the suspect or
accused person to have legal assistance at an earlier stage
than is possible under current, national-Dutch legal reg-
ulations. This proposal was in line with current practice
that already deviates from existing legislation in the
Criminal Procedure and with the guidelines referred to
above. These new rules give the suspect or accused
detained by the police for interrogation the right to con-
sult his or her lawyer prior to interrogation. There were
no exceptions to this right although it could be waived
by the suspect or accused. Next to that, this first draft
bill provided the right to have a lawyer present during
interrogation. However, this provision was limited to
cases in which the suspect or accused was suspected of
having committed an offence punishable by a minimum
term of imprisonment of six years which in effect meant
a limitation of legal assistance during interrogation to
serious offences. The drafters of the first draft bill based
this not insignificant restriction in the right to legal
20. See: <www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten-en-publicaties/regelingen/
2011/04/18/wetsvoorst-rechtsbijstand-en-politieverhoor.html>.
21. Directive 2013/48/EU, 22 October 2013, Pb EU L249, preambule
para. 21.
22. Published in the Official Journal of the EU on 6 November 2013.
23. Newsfeed of the Dutch Government, 13 February 2014; see: <www.
rijksoverheid.nl/nieuws/2014/02/13recht-op-bijstand-van-raadsman-
tijdens-politieverhoor.html>.
24. Draft bill on legal assistance and police interrogation, 22 March 2011.
assistance during police interrogation on the ruling of
the ECtHR in the Salduz case. The fact that the Court
in this particular case pointed out that the right to legal
assistance deriving from Article 6 of the ECHR is not
unlimited was considered a motive for this limitation:
51. The Court further reiterates that although not
absolute, the right of everyone charged with a crimi-
nal offence to be effectively defended by a lawyer,
assigned officially if need be, is one of the funda-
mental features of a fair trial (see Poitrimol v. France,
§ 34,25 and Demebukov v. Bulgaria, § 5026). Never-
theless, Article 6 § 3 (c) does not specify the manner
in which this right can be exercised. It thus leaves to
the Contracting States the choice of the means of
ensuring that it is secured in their judicial systems,
the Court’s task being only to ascertain whether the
method they have chosen is consistent with the
requirements of a fair trial. In this respect, it must be
remembered that the Convention is designed to
“guarantee not rights that are theoretical or illusory
but rights that are practical and effective” and that
assigning counsel does not in itself ensure the effec-
tiveness of the assistance he may afford an accused
(see Imbrioscia, cited above, § 38).
52. National laws may draw consequences from the
attitude of an accused in the initial stages of police
interrogation that could be decisive for the defence of
the accused in any subsequent criminal proceedings.
In such circumstances Article 6 will normally require
that the accused be allowed to benefit from the assis-
tance of a lawyer in the initial stages of police inter-
rogation. However, this right has so far been deemed
to be subject to restrictions for good cause. The ques-
tion is therefore whether such restriction is justified
in each individual case and whether in the light of the
proceedings as a whole such a restriction does not
deprive the accused of a fair hearing, for even a justi-
fied restriction can do so in certain circumstances (see
John Murray, cited above, § 63; Brennan, cited above,
§ 45; and Magee, cited above, § 44).
Despite the motives found in these paragraphs of the
Salduz case, the rules proposed in the first draft bill
have been overtaken by developments in the other
source of European law relevant to the Netherlands, the
European Union: as a result of the Salduz verdict,
explaining Article 6 of the ECHR in a more elaborate
way, the European Union institutions found grounds to
propose a Directive with the objective of setting mini-
mum standards in all the Member States for the right of
access to a lawyer, the right to communicate with a law-
yer after arrest, and the right to have a third party
25. ECHR 23 November 1993, Series A No. 277A, Poitrimol v. France.
26. ECHR 28 February 2008, Appl. No. 68020/ 01, 28 February 2008,
Demebukov v. Bulgaria.
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informed upon deprivation of liberty.27 This proposal
was done as part of the ‘roadmap’ strengthening proce-
dural rights of suspects and accused persons in criminal
proceedings.28 These common minimum rules should
lead to increased confidence in the criminal justice sys-
tem of all Member States, which in turn should contrib-
ute to more efficient judicial cooperation on the legal
basis of mutual trust.29 After having discussed a few
concept versions, the adopted version of the Directive,
Pb EU 2013, L 294, was published in the Official
Journal of the EU on 6 November 2013.30 The first
striking element of the Directive is that it offers fewer
possibilities for the Member States to limit or defer the
right of access to a lawyer than offered by the ECtHR in
its interpretation of the right of access to a lawyer.
The first, initial, Dutch draft bill on legal assistance and
police interrogation also had another remarkable aspect.
This first draft proposal argued that adequately
regulating legal assistance prior to and during police
interrogation in the primary stage of an investigation
and criminal proceedings required changes in the sys-
tem of custodial measures to which suspected or accused
persons can be submitted as well. In the Netherlands,
with regard to criminal law, the emphasis is currently
largely placed on a quick trial in court and the imposi-
tion of measures depriving a person of his liberty by the
judge. In the Netherlands the relatively long period of
deprivation of liberty without the involvement of a
judge is a matter that has several times led to questions
as to whether or not Dutch legislation in this field con-
flicts with the rights laid down in Article 5 of the
ECHR. The first draft bill also aimed to adjust and
improve this aspect of criminal proceedings in the
Netherlands to bring it in to line with the standards of
the ECHR and the ECtHR, but these aspects are now,
as mentioned earlier, regulated in a separate draft bill
proposal.
As mentioned earlier, the first draft was altered and
divided into two separate draft bills. The division of the
proposal into two separate drafts as well as the modifica-
tions and changes of the regulations were related to the
adoption of Directive, Pb EU 2013, L 294. Apparently,
the conclusion was drawn that the initial draft proposal
did not meet the requirements set out in the Directive.
The question whether the scope of the first Dutch pro-
posal reached far enough to appease the more far-
stretching Directive of the European Union on the right
of access to a lawyer in criminal proceedings and on the
right to communicate upon arrest arose in particular.31
27. Directive 2013/48/EU, 22 October 2013, Pb EU L249, introduction
para. 1 refers to Art. 47 the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the Euro-
pean Union (the Charter).
28. Adopted by the Council on 30 November 2009, OJ C 295, 4 December
2009, at 1.
29. Proposal for the Directive of the European Parliament and of the Coun-
cil on the right of access to a lawyer in criminal procedures and on the
right to communicate upon arrest, 11497/11, preambule (9), at 5.
30. OJ, Directive Pb EU 2013, L 294.
31. See amongst others: the pre-advice of the ‘Adviescommissie Strafrecht
inzake conceptwetsvoorstel rechtsbijstand en politieverhoor’, at 3.
The new draft proposal, replacing the first draft bill
partially, with a focus on implementing the EU-
Directive, Pb EU 2013, L 294, is supposed to meet the
requirements set out by the EU-Directive as well as the
standards following from the verdicts of the ECtHR on
this matter.
Now the question arises whether or not the new, second
draft bill, the one that sets out to implement the
EU-Directive, meets the standards set out in the EU-
Directive, in particular those standards considered to be
common minimum rules for all Member States. Since
the presence of a lawyer prior to and during police inter-
rogation has the largest impact on the current criminal
proceedings in the Netherlands, this article will place
emphasis on those rights. In order to provide an answer
to this question, the following paragraph discusses the
substance of the Directive, Pb EU 2013, L 294, regard-
ing the presence of a lawyer prior to and during police
interrogation. Other aspects of the Directive such as the
right to appoint a lawyer in a Member State as a part of
European Arrest Warrant proceedings or the possibility
for a suspect to inform a third party of the deprivation
of liberty and to communicate with a third party and
consular authorities will be discussed briefly. Next, the
new proposed draft bill, drafted to implement the afore-
mentioned Directive, will be discussed. After that, an
assessment will be made whether or not the standards as
set out in the Directive are met. Besides that, some
remarks on the verdict of the Supreme Court concern-
ing the presence of the lawyer during police interroga-
tion will be discussed. The paper concludes with the
findings of this research.
2 Substance of the Directive
The Directive regards the right of access to a lawyer
during criminal proceedings and the right to communi-
cate upon arrest32 (hereafter: the Directive). Since this
paper will focus primarily on the presence of a lawyer
during police interrogation resulting from the Salduz
verdict and this Directive, the outline of the Directive
will be limited to the right of access to a lawyer during
criminal proceedings involving adult suspects or
accused persons and the related duty to provide infor-
mation pursuant to the Directive. For the sake of clari-
ty, this paragraph briefly summons up the substance of
the provisions in the Directive to enable a comparison to
be made with the (newly) draft bill in the next part of
this paper.
The Directive of the European Union on the right of
access to a lawyer in criminal proceedings and the right
to communicate upon arrest comprises 18 articles which
address the subject in groups. The first two articles con-
tain the definition of the subject as well as the scope of
the Directive. The objective of the Directive is to create
common minimum rules in the entire European Union
32. Directive 2013/48/EU, 22 October 2013, Pb EU L249.
179
Paul Mevis & Joost Verbaan ELR December 2014 | No. 4
regarding the rights of suspects and accused persons and
persons submitted to execution determined in the
Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA (Euro-
pean Arrest Warrant) on the right to access to a lawyer,
to inform a third person of the deprivation of liberty,
and the right to communicate with third persons and
consular authorities during the deprivation of liberty.33
The background to the Directive, as already highlighted
in the introduction, is reflected in this objective.
Although the objective of the Directive is indeed to
strengthen the procedural guarantees of the accused, it
should be borne in mind that it (also) does so with a
view to further strengthening and facilitating judicial
cooperation between the Member States of the
European Union based on the principle of mutual
recognition. This objective of strengthening judicial
cooperation is not the same as the ‘pure’ human rights
context of the ECHR and the case law of the ECtHR.
The Directive applies to suspects or accused in a crimi-
nal investigation from the moment they are informed of
a suspicion raised against them by the competent
authorities of a Member State. This information may be
given in the form of an official notification, but can be
effected in other ways as well. Regardless the question
of whether the person in respect thereof has been
deprived of freedom it applies, although the right to
legal assistance is of course particularly intended for this
category of suspects. According to its text, the rights of
the Directive continue to apply until the completion of
the investigation, which is the final determination of the
question whether the suspected or accused person has
committed the offence. This includes, if applicable,
sentencing and treatment of the criminal appeal
proceedings (for the Netherlands, the appeal, the appeal
in cassation, and partly review, both favourable and
unfavourable in particular).34
The Directive shall also apply to persons subject to the
implementation of the European Arrest Warrant from
the moment they are held in the implementing Member
State, in the manner laid down in this Directive.35 The
provisions on the application of the Directive also laid
down in Article 2 are of some practical importance; the
rights under these provisions are also applicable, under
the same conditions as referred to in the first paragraph,
to persons who are not (initially) questioned as a suspect
or accused but who come to be regarded as a suspect or
accused during the course of the interrogation by police
or other competent authorities as well.
Of greater importance, most certainly for the Dutch sit-
uation, are the provisions of the fourth paragraph of
Article 2. In case of ‘insignificant facts’, and without
prejudicing the right to a fair trial, this paragraph
applies if no custodial sentence can be imposed as a
sanction, or if under the laws of a Member States,
jurisdiction to impose sanctions can be mandated to
33. Directive 2013/48/EU, 22 October 2013, Pb EU L249, Art. 1.
34. Directive 2013/48/EU, 22 October 2013, Pb EU L249, Art. 2, para. 1.
35. Directive 2013/48/EU, 22 October 2013, Pb EU L249, Art. 2, para. 2
and Art. 10.
authorities other than the judiciary, and if they impose
sanctions, those sanctions can be challenged in court.
This Directive is only applicable to criminal court cases,
containing investigative proceedings conducted by or on
behalf of the court as well. Nevertheless, the Directive is
fully applicable if the suspect or accused person is
deprived of liberty, regardless of the stage or phase of
the investigation.36
The second group of articles in this Directive is of vital
interest for this paper, namely, Article 3 and Article 4 of
the Directive, with the primary focus on Article 3 which
deals with the right of access to a lawyer and, more spe-
cifically, the matter of having a lawyer present during
police interrogation. When and if actual communication
between the suspect or accused and his lawyer takes
place, it goes without saying that this communication
and its content should be confidential and should be
treated as such, according to Article 4.37 Since the mat-
ter of confidentiality as set out in the Directive does not
require any amendments in Dutch legislation nor leads
to any such amendments in the proposed Dutch draft
bills, we will not discuss the content of this article in
this paper. Article 3 obligates every Member State to
ensure that suspects and accused persons have the right
of access to a lawyer at such a time and in such a manner
so as to allow the person concerned to exercise his rights
of defence practically and effectively.38 They shall have
access to a lawyer without undue delay. In any event,
they shall have access to a lawyer from, whichever
comes first, the moment before he or she is questioned
by police or other enforcement or judicial authorities or
upon the carrying out of an investigative or other
evidence-gathering act by an investigative or other com-
petent authority, from the deprivation of liberty without
undue delay or in due time before the suspect or
accused person appears before the court, having been
summoned to appear before that court having jurisdic-
tion in criminal matters.39
The right of access to a lawyer contains the notion that
the Member State has to ensure that a suspect or
accused person has the right to meet in private and com-
municate with the lawyer representing him, prior to
questioning by the police or other judicial or law-
enforcing authorities.40 During questioning of the sus-
pect or the accused, the lawyer shall have the right to be
present and participate effectively. His participation can
be regulated by procedures in national law, as long as
these procedures themselves do not prejudice the effec-
tive exercise and essence of this right. In accordance
with national law, the participation of the lawyer shall
be recorded.41 The suspect or the accused has, as a min-
imum, the right for their lawyer to attend the following
36. Directive 2013/48/EU, 22 October 2013, Pb EU L249, Art. 2, para. 4.
37. Directive 2013/48/EU, 22 October 2013, Pb EU L249, Art. 4.
38. Directive 2013/48/EU, 22 October 2013, Pb EU L249, Art. 3, para. 1.
39. Directive 2013/48/EU, 22 October 2013, Pb EU L249, Art. 3, para. 2.
40. Directive 2013/48/EU, 22 October 2013, Pb EU L249, Art. 3, para. 3
under a.
41. Directive 2013/48/EU, 22 October 2013, Pb EU L249, Art. 3, para. 3
under b.
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investigative or evidence-gathering acts, if provided by
national law, and he is required or permitted to attend:
identity parades, confrontations, or experimental recon-
structions of the scene of the crime.42 General
information to facilitate suspects or accused persons in
obtaining a lawyer should be made available as well as
the necessary arrangements, notwithstanding provisions
of national law concerning the mandatory presence of a
lawyer, to ensure that suspects or accused persons,
deprived of their liberty, shall be in a position to effec-
tively exercise their right of access to a lawyer, unless
they have waived this right in accordance with
Article 9.43
Temporary derogations from the application to consult
a lawyer after the deprivation of liberty may only be
made in the pre-trial stage in exceptional circumstances,
when the geographical remoteness of a suspect or
accused person makes it impossible to ensure this
right.44 From the application to gain access to a lawyer
to meet with him in private, communicate with him and
have him present at the questioning by the police as well
as investigative or evidence-gathering acts, temporary
derogations can only be made, in exceptional circum-
stances, when this is justified and to the extent that this
is or can be perceived as justified in the light of the par-
ticular circumstances of the case, by one or more com-
pelling reasons, such as an urgent need to avert serious
adverse consequences for the life, liberty or physical
integrity of a person or an imperative immediate action
preventing a substantial jeopardy to criminal proceed-
ings by investigative authorities.45
The next group of articles, Articles 5, 6, and 7, regulate
the right of informing a third person of the deprivation
of liberty and communication with a third person and
consular authorities. These articles of the Directive do
not affect current Dutch legislation and like Article 4 of
the Directive have not led to any proposals to change
current legislation in the Dutch draft bills; therefore,
these articles will not be discussed at this moment.
An important part of the Directive is formed by the fol-
lowing group of articles, Articles 8 and 9, which deal
with derogations and waivers. Article 8 formulates
general conditions for applying the (sole) temporary
derogations allowed to infringe the right of access to a
lawyer (Article 3) on the basis of subparagraph 5 or 6 of
that article exclusively. Such temporary derogations in
all cases have to be proportionate and should not go
beyond what is necessary. The limitations shall be
strictly limited in time, shall not exclusively be based on
the type or the seriousness of the alleged offence, and
shall not prejudice the overall fairness of the proceed-
ings.46 Temporary derogations with regard to the insur-
ance that suspects and accused persons have a right of
access to a lawyer in such a manner so as to allow the
42. Directive 2013/48/EU, 22 October 2013, Pb EU L249, Art. 3, para. 3
under c.
43. Directive 2013/48/EU, 22 October 2013, Pb EU L249, Art. 3, para. 4.
44. Directive 2013/48/EU, 22 October 2013, Pb EU L249, Art. 3, para. 5.
45. Directive 2013/48/EU, 22 October 2013, Pb EU L249, Art. 3, para. 6.
46. Directive 2013/48/EU, 22 October 2013, Pb EU L249, Art. 8, para. 1.
person concerned to exercise his rights of defence prac-
tically and effectively may only be authorised by a judi-
cial authority or other competent authorities on the
ground of the particular case by a duly reasoned deci-
sion. This decision shall be open for submission to a
judicial review. The duly reasoned decision shall, in
accordance with national law, be recorded.47 Temporary
derogations with regard to having a third person
informed of the deprivation of liberty can only be
authorised either by a judicial or other competent
authorities on the ground of a particular case on condi-
tion that this decision can be submitted to judicial
review.48
It is rather remarkable, as such, that the Directive leaves
room for a waiver of the right of access to a lawyer, as
meant in Article 3. One might argue, as mentioned in
the introduction, that the background of introducing
this right consists of rather different reasons. As it is
broadly accepted that a suspect or an accused person has
the right to organise his defence in the way that he con-
siders to be best (an approach to rights of the defence
which makes the use of waivers acceptable); neverthe-
less, it must be held into consideration, as spoken of ear-
lier, that the right of access to a lawyer also fulfils a
function in the prevention of ill-treatment and in the
prevention of miscarriages of justice. Seen against the
background of the latter, a waiver of his rights from the
accused before he is interrogated by the police for
instance can be open for debate.
Nevertheless, if a waiver of this fundamental right is
accepted as such, it can be considered as rather wise that
the Directive actually formulates the conditions which
legitimate waivers, as is done in Article 9. In relation to
the waiver of a right referred to in Article 3 (or 10), it is
ensured, without prejudice to the national law, requir-
ing mandatory presence or assistance of a lawyer, that a
suspect or accused is provided with clear and sufficient
information in simple and understandable language
about the content of the right concerned and possible
consequences of the waiver of this right. This informa-
tion can be provided orally or written. Next to that, the
waiver has to be given voluntarily and unequivocally by
the suspect or accused person.49 Temporary derogations
with regard to having a third person informed of the
deprivation of liberty can only be authorised either by a
judicial or another competent authority on the grounds
of the particular case on condition that this decision can
be submitted to judicial review.
The circumstances under which the waiver, made orally
or in writing, was given shall be noted in accordance
with national law.50
The waiver can be revoked at any point during the
criminal proceedings, and the suspect or accused person
shall be informed about this possibility. The revocation
comes into effect from the moment in time the revoca-
47. Directive 2013/48/EU, 22 October 2013, Pb EU L249, Art. 8, para. 2.
48. Directive 2013/48/EU, 22 October 2013, Pb EU L249, Art. 8, para. 3.
49. Directive 2013/48/EU, 22 October 2013, Pb EU L249, Art. 9, para. 1.
50. Directive 2013/48/EU, 22 October 2013, Pb EU L249, Art. 9, para. 2.
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tion is made.51 From that moment on, the effect will
only be prosperous; in principle, it does not make earlier
statements under the waiver illegal nor does it exclude
the use of earlier statements made under the waiver as
such, as evidence against the suspect or the accused.
Article 10 deals with European Arrest Warrant proceed-
ings. It generally states that the rights provided for in
this Directive shall also apply in the case of a procedure
in accordance with a European Arrest Warrant.
The final group of articles in the Directive contains the
rather usual regulations in Directives concerning legal
aid, remedies, non-regression clauses, adaptation of the
Directive in national law, and the addressees. The con-
tent of a few articles in this category is of particular
interest, with regard to the central issue of this paper:
the access of a lawyer prior to and during police inter-
rogation in present and future Dutch law. Article 12, on
remedies, obliges the Member State to ensure that the
suspect or accused persons in criminal proceedings as
well as requested persons in European Arrest Warrant
proceedings have, where their rights under this
Directive have been breached, an effective remedy
under national law. A Member State ensures that, with-
out prejudice to national rules on systems on the
(in-)admissibility of evidence in criminal proceedings, in
the assessment of statements made by a suspect or
accused person or evidence obtained in breach of his
right to a lawyer or in cases where a derogation to this
right was authorised in accordance with Article 3, para-
graph six, the rights of the defence and fairness of the
proceedings are respected.52 This article is of particular
interest, since the sanction that follows on the breach of
this right is the immediate exclusion of that statement
for use in evidence. Whether or not these statements
made under the infringements of rights is left to the
national law of the Member States, the Directive as such
does not oblige Member States to sanction the breach of
this right with exclusion of evidence. Neither the ECHR
nor the rulings of the ECtHR recognise the exclusion of
unlawfully obtained evidence as a general necessary
sanction; e.g., the use of evidence obtained in breach of
Article 8 of the ECHR, as such, does not immediately
lead to the conclusion that there has been a breach of the
fair trial principle per se.53 But the specific right of the
accused to have access to a lawyer has a slightly different
nuance. In the explanatory memorandum of the
Directive (section 50), it is correctly pointed out that
case law of ECtHR provides that the rights of the
defence are in principle irrevocably violated when
incriminating statements made during a police interrog-
ation in absence of a lawyer are used as evidence against
the accused. Such violation of rights, regarded as highly
fundamental, can – within this context – imply less to
nothing than the exclusion of evidence obtained directly
on the basis of such violation. Therefore, it is lamenta-
51. Directive 2013/48/EU, 22 October 2013, Pb EU L249, Art. 9, para. 3.
52. Directive 2013/48/EU, 22 October 2013, Pb EU L249, Art. 12, para. 2
under a.
53. As follows amongst other from ECHR 27 April 2004, Appl. No.
50210/99, Doerga v. the Netherlands.
ble that, although the Directive does not contain an
explicit mandate to respect the law of the ECtHR,54 it
does not reach further, as, for example, Article 15 of the
UN anti-torture convention does, by explicitly prescrib-
ing that such evidence should be excluded.55 In the fol-
lowing part of this paper, we will examine to which
extent further form and content is given in the Nether-
lands to the exclusion of statements made by an accused
person, as evidence when it is established by the judge
that these statements were obtained violating the right
of the accused under the Directive as discussed above.
For the right to access to a lawyer and to communicate
with him prior to, during, as well as after the police
interrogation, Article 13, in particular, is of interest.
The content of the article in the Directive in itself is
limited. It obligates a Member State to ensure that in
the application of the Directive the particular needs of
the vulnerable suspects and vulnerable accused persons
are taken into account. The implications of this short
content could be much wider reaching however. The
general principle, laid down in paragraph 51 of the
explanatory memorandum, is rather strict and funda-
mental. The prosecuting authorities in relation to sus-
pects and accused in a potentially weak position have an
(additional) duty. The observation of this is the basis of
a fair administration of justice. Conversely, fair adminis-
tration of justice means, after all, that measures must be
taken to provide assistance in case of individual inability
on the part of specific suspects to exercise their own
rights properly. This requires additional facilities to
enable the actual exercising and realisation of the rights
under the Directive vis-à-vis this particular group of
suspects as well. If we limit ourselves to criminal pro-
ceedings against adult suspects and accused, then in
particular the suspect or accused with a certain degree
of mental illness, whether or not due to an addiction, is
important. Traditionally this concerns a relatively large
group amongst the arrested suspects or accused. What
should the duty of care towards them entail? To us,
within this context, it seems that in the first place of
realising the right of access to a lawyer from the moment
this right arises, judicial authorities must recognise that
a particular case involves a vulnerable suspect. Recogni-
tion, also based on adequate training and experience, is
the first phase in performing this duty of care. Next, an
appropriate decision based on this recognition should
(be able to) be taken as to the extent in which the sus-
pect is able to understand and exercise his rights. Where
too much doubt about this exists, in particular during
the first police interrogation, there must be adequate
provisions for calling in an expert at any time, if so
desired. This could include a system in which the police
can use emergency mental health services. The question
54. According to the usual non-regression clause (Art. 14 of the Directive),
nothing in the Directive shall be construed as limiting or derogating
from any rights and procedural safeguards that are ensured under the
Charter, the ECHR, and other relevant provisions of international law or
higher level of protection provided by the law of any Member State.
55. Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhumane or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment of 10 December 1984, Trb. 1985, 69.
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arises as to whether it is possible to always arrange these
facilities in the first phase of the criminal investigation,
the (first) interrogation of the (detained) accused, suffi-
ciently. Where, perhaps as the result of such a proce-
dure, (too) many doubts exist regarding the suspects' or
accused persons' capacity to understand his rights and to
(actually and effectively) exercise these himself, his right
of access of a lawyer should be (able to be) replaced by a
system in which the lawyer can exercise the rights on his
behalf (see for the Dutch situation Article 509a of the
Dutch Code of Criminal Procedure). As this decision is
very drastic, one should wonder whether or not this
decision should not be reserved exclusively to a court.
The duty of care may also include the decision whether
or not trial and punishment is the most appropriate
course of actions for the vulnerable suspect. Possibly it
could be better for the vulnerable suspect to channel
him through the civil mental health facilities because of,
for example, serious doubts as to his culpability or his
‘fitness’ to stand to trial. Be that as it may, in all cases
attention for vulnerable persons will be of vital impor-
tance if a waiver of the rights given by this Directive,
based on Article 9, is made.
Such a waiver is only legitimate if it is established with
sufficient understanding of the issue, with an under-
standing of the consequences of the waiver, and with
sufficient free will. In the event of a waiver by a vulnera-
ble person, timely and adequate attention must be paid
to ensure that these conditions are met at the time the
waiver is made. In this context, it is important to men-
tion that the second paragraph of Article 9 provides that
the circumstances under which the waiver is made are
recorded. It is very important, on this point, that due
care is exercised in relation to the rights under the
Directive for vulnerable persons. After all, if too many
doubts remain as to whether the special needs of
vulnerable persons, as required under Article 13 of the
Directive, have been met or arise afterwards, this means
a violation of the Directive and the right of access to a
lawyer, which can often lead to the exclusion of the
statement made by the vulnerable person, in other
Member States in case of cooperation in criminal mat-
ters and in national cases even after a criminal case has
already been closed by a final court ruling.56 This can
also harm the interests of criminal justice. In fact, it is
precisely because the Directive aims, by protecting and
shaping the right of access to a lawyer , to contribute to
the further strengthening and realisation of mutual
cooperation in criminal cases within the EU Member
States on the basis of the principle of mutual recogni-
tion, which makes it imperative that in appropriate cases
sufficient attention is paid to this issue in the requested
state, in order to prevent the arising of later difficulties
in and under the national law of the requesting state, as
far as further prosecution of the suspect or accused per-
56. See for an example for the Netherlands: Dutch Supreme Court
29 October 2013, ECLI:NL:HR:2013:1070; the fact that at the time of
making his statement of confession a suspect may have been suffering
a psychosis could be considered a reason to revise the previously given,
irrevocable sentence.
son is concerned. Of course, within that context, the
registration prescribed in Article 9 of that which has
occurred in requested state is of interest as well.
The second Dutch response towards the above-
mentioned rights, as laid down in the Directive, will be
discussed in the following paragraph. Describing the
rights as laid down in the draft following the initial first
draft will enable us to determine whether or not the
aims of the Directive are met by the Dutch legislator.
3 The Second Proposed Draft
Bill
As stated above, the first draft bill on legal assistance
and police interrogation aiming to amend Dutch crimi-
nal procedure law was presented by the Ministry of
Security and Justice on 22 March 2011. This first draft
bill amending the Dutch Penal Code addressed several
parts and aspects of criminal proceedings in the
Netherlands. On one hand, it focused on enabling the
lawyer to be present prior to, during, and after the
police interrogation, and on the other hand, its focus
was on changing the criminal procedures with regard to
the deprivation of liberty in the first phases of the crimi-
nal investigation.
As explained in the introduction of this paper, the first
draft bill intending to transpose the rights, reflecting the
developments within the Council of Europe and the
European Union, was to be founded on the Guidelines
of the Public Prosecution referred to above and, also
referred to earlier, on the results from experiments in
police interrogation with a lawyer present. This first
draft bill however was drafted long before the Directive
was established by the Member States of the EU. As
mentioned earlier, the establishment of the EU-
Directive, as well as the restrained approach of the mat-
ter by the Dutch government and institutions, created
arguments to divide the first draft proposal into two
amended draft proposals: one with a focus on imple-
menting the established European Union Directive and
one to process the changes in the criminal proceedings
in the first phase of the criminal investigation in Dutch
Criminal Proceedings.
This paper primarily has a focus on the regulation of
legal assistance of (adult) suspects prior to, during, and
after police interrogation. This paragraph provides an
overview of the substance of the second proposed draft
bill aiming on the implementation of the European
Directive and defines the framework the Dutch legisla-
tor has set out in transposing the Directive into national
regulation.
As far as the grounds for the right to legal assistance
during police interrogation are concerned, the draft bill
is in line with the choice made by European law. In oth-
er words, unlike current Dutch rules governing criminal
proceedings, the new rules provide for the extensive
regulation of legal assistance for the suspect or accused
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prior to and during police interrogation. The arrest of a
suspect or an accused person with a view to interroga-
tion is, under Dutch criminal law, the first stage in the
deprivation of liberty by the police under the authority
of the public prosecutor. Dutch Criminal Proceedings
do not provide for a writ of ‘habeas corpus’.
Article 1 of the second draft bill proposes the amend-
ment of the earlier proposed, however not yet adopted
Article 27c CPC, which will require that suspects or
accused persons are provided with certain information
in the criminal procedures.57 The amendment of the
proposed article will mean that information given to a
suspect deprived of his liberty should also entail the
information on the possibility of informing a third per-
son as well as consular authorities of the deprivation of
liberty.58 Next to the extension of the earlier proposed
article, Article 27c CPC, the second draft bill proposes
two new articles: Article 27d and 27e CPC. The first
contains the requirement to remind the person of the
capacity in which he is being heard in case of an invita-
tion to come to make a statement to the police, either at
the police station or over the phone.59 If a suspicion
towards a person heard as witness arises, the interrogat-
ing police officer should notify the person of the rights
mentioned in the first two paragraphs of Article 27c
CPC.60 The second, Article 27e CPC, obliges the depu-
ty public prosecutor61 to inform without delay, at least
one person appointed by the suspected, about the depri-
vation of liberty.62 If a suspect or accused person does
not have the Dutch nationality, the deputy public prose-
cutor informs the consular authorities of his
nationality.63 Informing the appointed third party on
the deprivation of liberty of the suspect can be delayed
if the delay can be perceived as justified by one or more
compelling reasons, such as an urgent need to avert seri-
ous adverse consequences for the life, liberty, or physi-
cal integrity of a person or an imperative immediate
action preventing a substantial jeopardy to criminal pro-
ceedings by investigative authorities.64
The proposed new first paragraph of Article 28 forms
an introduction on the newly shaped regulation of assis-
57. Art. 27c was proposed on 13 February 2014 and has passed the
Tweede Kamer (House of Representatives), and the bill is currently sub-
mitted to a parliamentary committee of the Eerste Kamer (Senate), Par-
liamentary Papers II, 2014-2015, 33871, No. 5.
58. Second draft Bill on implementing the EU-Directive 2013/48/EU (PbEU
L294), Art. 27c, para. 3 under g and h.
59. Second draft Bill on implementing the EU-Directive 2013/48/EU (PbEU
L294), Art. 27d, para. 1.
60. Art. 27c has, as mentioned, not yet entered into force; following Parlia-
mentary Papers II, 2014-2015, 33871, the proposed first two para-
graphs of Art. 27c CPC refer to the right to be notified of which offence
he is a suspect, the right for a suspect with insufficient command of the
Dutch language to be assisted by an interpreter, and the right to make
effective use of his right to legal assistance.
61. Usually a higher-ranked officer of police, not necessarily a member of
the Public Prosecution Service
62. Second draft Bill on implementing the EU-Directive 2013/48/EU (PbEU
L294), Art. 27e, para. 1.
63. Second draft Bill on implementing the EU-Directive 2013/48/EU (PbEU
L294), Art. 27e, para. 2.
64. Second draft Bill on implementing the EU-Directive 2013/48/EU (PbEU
L294), Art. 27e, para. 3.
tance by a lawyer, as laid down in the proposed Articles
28a till 28d CPC.65 Article 28a, first paragraph, gives the
suspect the option to waive his right consciously and
voluntarily, unless the Criminal Procedure Code dic-
tates otherwise. Whether the suspect acted voluntarily is
of prime interest. No pressure whatsoever may be put
on him to waive his rights as this could later support
allegations that the defence was involuntarily. Under the
Dutch Criminal Proceedings, it is up to the judge to
decide whether or not these conditions were met. The
second paragraph of the proposed article is of interest in
this context. A suspect can only make a waiver of his
right mentioned in the firstparagraph, if he is informed
about the consequences of this waiver by a judge or a
police officer and informed on the fact that he can with-
draw the waiver at any time. If a waiver is made, a
report of such shall be made in the minutes. The regula-
tions make no mention of reporting the circumstances
under which the waiver came about, a report which
could be of interest with a view to the (judicial) review
of the conditions of voluntariness and consciousness, as
required by regulations regarding the waiver itself. The
memorandum states explicitly that information provi-
ded once stands as sufficient.66
Contrary to the first proposed draft bill, this second
draft offers regulations regarding vulnerable persons as
well as suspect of crimes punishable with a maximum of
twelve or more years of imprisonment. If a suspect is
vulnerable or under suspicion of a crime punishable
with a maximum of twelve years or more of imprison-
ment, the deputy public prosecutor informs the board of
the Council of Legal Assistance, so that the board pro-
vides actual legal assistance by a lawyer.67 The board of
the Council of Legal Assistance is also informed in case
a suspect, who has not chosen a lawyer and desires to
have legal assistance, is arrested for a crime for which
pre-trial detention is allowed. In this case the board will
designate a lawyer to the suspect.68 If the suspect desires
legal assistance in case the arrest is for a crime for which
pre-trial detention is not allowed, he will be, at his
request, given the opportunity to make a phone call with
a lawyer and communicate with him.69
Rather remarkable is the fact that a lawyer in principle
has to be present and available for legal assistance within
two hours. If he is not available within that time limit,
the deputy public prosecutor can decide to start with
interrogating of the suspect without the lawyer present.
The deputy public prosecutor can stretch the men-
65. Second draft Bill on implementing the EU-Directive 2013/48/EU (PbEU
L294), Art. 28, para. 1.
66. Explanatory Memorandum 2nd draft Bill on implementing the EU-
Directive2013/48/EU (L 294), at 66-67.
67. Second draft Bill on implementing the EU-Directive 2013/48/EU (PbEU
L294), Art. 28b, para. 2.
68. Second draft Bill on implementing the EU-Directive 2013/48/EU (PbEU
L294), Art. 28b, para. 3.
69. Second draft Bill on implementing the EU-Directive 2013/48/EU (PbEU
L294), Art. 28b, para. 3.
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tioned limit, on request of the lawyer, without detaining
the investigation.70
If a lawyer, following Article 28b, is available, the sus-
pect is offered the right to communicate with him prior
to the first interrogation by police for half an hour.71
With authorisation of the public prosecutor, the deputy
public prosecutor can decide that the interrogation
starts within the time limit of two hours, offered to the
lawyer to be present at interrogation, or refuse the right
to communicate with a lawyer for half an hour, as laid
down in the first paragraph of this article, when this can
be perceived as justified by one or more compelling rea-
sons, such as an urgent need to avert serious adverse
consequences for the life, liberty, or physical integrity of
a person or an imperative immediate action preventing a
substantial jeopardy to criminal proceedings by
investigative authorities.72 A waiver of the right to com-
municate with a lawyer prior to the interrogation by vul-
nerable suspects as well as suspects of crimes punishable
with a maximum of twelve or more years of imprison-
ment can only be done after the accused concerned is
informed of the consequences of this waiver by a lawyer
prior to the waiver being made.73 Thus with these kinds
of suspects, there always has to be contact between the
lawyer and the suspect prior to the first police interroga-
tion.
The lawyer has the right to be present during police
interrogation and participate in the interrogation, at the
request of the arrested or invited suspect. The request is
made to the interrogating officer or the deputy public
prosecutor. The latter can reject a request to interrupt
interrogations, if repeated requests disturb the order or
the progress of the police interrogation. The lawyer’s
presence and participation to the interrogation will be
reported in the minutes.74
With prior authorisation of the public prosecutor, the
deputy public prosecutor can refuse to give a lawyer
access to the interrogation when this can be perceived as
justified by one or more compelling reasons. These
compelling reasons are equal to the grounds on which
the right to communicate with a lawyer prior to the
interrogation can be denied.75 During police interroga-
tion without a lawyer present, the suspect can request
interruption of the interrogation in order to consult with
his lawyer. The request is granted as often as possible
unless the repeated requests disturb the order and pro-
gress of the interrogation.76 The drafter considered the
70. Second draft Bill on implementing the EU-Directive 2013/48/EU (PbEU
L294), Art. 28b, para. 4.
71. Second draft Bill on implementing the EU-Directive 2013/48/EU (PbEU
L294), Art. 28c, para. 1.
72. Second draft Bill on implementing the EU-Directive 2013/48/EU (PbEU
L294), Art. 28c, para. 2.
73. Second draft Bill on implementing the EU-Directive 2013/48/EU (PbEU
L294), Art. 28c, para. 3.
74. Second draft Bill on implementing the EU-Directive 2013/48/EU (PbEU
L294), Art. 28d, para. 1.
75. Second draft Bill on implementing the EU-Directive 2013/48/EU (PbEU
L294), Art. 28d, para. 2.
76. Second draft Bill on implementing the EU-Directive 2013/48/EU (PbEU
L294), Art. 28d, para. 3.
fact that criminal proceedings are best served by an
uninterrupted interrogation as a ground to give the
investigative authorities this power.77 Exercising the
powers to deny communication and consultation prior
to and during interrogation is to be immediately
reported to the public prosecutor by the deputy public
prosecutor. This decision only applies to the interroga-
tion in which they were made, the grounds on which
they were founded shall be mentioned in the minutes.78
When the lawyer is denied access for the interrogation,
this should be recorded in a manner determined by the
implementing rules.79 The implementing rules can set
out general rules on the manner and order of interroga-
tions.80
After the four articles drafting the general shape of legal
assistance prior to and during interrogation, the draft
sums up an article dealing with the Council for Legal
Assistance and articles providing rules for a specific
group of vulnerable persons.
After being informed by the deputy public prosecutor of
an arrest of suspects referred to in the first two para-
graphs of Article 28b, as well as a notification of a deten-
tion in police custody of a suspect who did not appeal
for legal assistance until that moment, the board of the
Council for Legal Assistance immediately provides the
suspect with a lawyer.81 In order to provide the suspect
with a lawyer as soon as possible, a list of registered law-
yers is used.82 Preferences for a specific lawyer are taken
into account by the Council.83 In case no lawyer is pres-
ent nor available in time, the deputy public prosecutor
or the public prosecutor informs the Council immedi-
ately in order to make sure the suspect is provided with
a lawyer.84 During the appeal of the public prosecution
of an immediate release order, the provided registered
lawyer represents the suspect as well. The provision of
the lawyer ends when the accused is arrested, with the
ending of the investigation as well as (extended) deten-
tion in police custody.85
When a minor is involved, the deputy public prosecutor
informs the suspect’s parents or custodian as soon as
possible after the arrest and of the reasons thereof.86
Informing the parents or custodian on the deprivation of
liberty of the suspect can be delayed for the same rea-
77. Explanatory Memorandum 2nd draft Bill on implementing the EU-
Directive2013/48/EU (L 294), at 48.
78. Second draft Bill on implementing the EU-Directive 2013/48/EU (PbEU
L294), Art. 28d, para. 4.
79. Second draft Bill on implementing the EU-Directive 2013/48/EU (PbEU
L294), Art. 28d, para. 5.
80. Second draft Bill on implementing the EU-Directive 2013/48/EU (PbEU
L294), Art. 28d, para. 6.
81. Second draft Bill on implementing the EU-Directive 2013/48/EU (PbEU
L294), Art. 40, para. 1.
82. Second draft Bill on implementing the EU-Directive 2013/48/EU (PbEU
L294), Art. 40, para. 2.
83. Second draft Bill on implementing the EU-Directive 2013/48/EU (PbEU
L294), Art. 40, para. 3.
84. Second draft Bill on implementing the EU-Directive 2013/48/EU (PbEU
L294), Art. 40, para. 4.
85. Second draft Bill on implementing the EU-Directive 2013/48/EU (PbEU
L294), Art. 40, paras. 5 and 6.
86. Second draft Bill on implementing the EU-Directive 2013/48/EU (PbEU
L294), Art. 488b para. 1.
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sons as not informing a third party, mentioned earlier. If
there is an actual delay, the deputy public prosecutor
immediately informs the Council for Child Protection.87
Finally the deputy public prosecutor informs the board
of the Council for Legal Assistance on the arrest of a
vulnerable suspect to ensure the board provides the
suspect with a lawyer.88 After being informed by the
deputy public prosecutor of the arrest, the board of the
Council for Legal Assistance immediately provides the
suspect with a lawyer.89 The deputy public prosecutor
has a possibility to start interrogation within the time
limit of two hours or refuse the right to communicate
with the lawyer prior to the interrogation with vulnera-
ble person as well. The delay can be perceived as justi-
fied by one or more compelling reasons, such as an
urgent need to avert serious adverse consequences for
the life, liberty, or physical integrity of a person or an
imperative immediate action preventing a substantial
jeopardy to criminal proceedings by investigative
authorities.90 The lawyer provided by the board of the
Council for Legal Assistance provides the vulnerable
suspect with assistance. The vulnerable suspect cannot
waiver the right to communicate to the lawyer prior to
the interrogation. During his conversation with the law-
yer, the necessity of his presence during interrogation is
discussed. The deputy public prosecutor is informed of
the outcome of the conversation. On the request of the
suspect, the lawyer provides legal assistance during
investigation. The implementing rules can set out
general rules on the manner and order of this kind of
interrogations.91
Next to the described proposed articles, the draft pro-
posal contains a few amendments to the Surrender
Act.92 The amendment of these articles is related to the
right to access to a lawyer in the extraditing country as
well.93 A possibility which has not been explicitly regu-
lated under Dutch Law. Whereas our focus is not on the
European Warrant, these articles will not be discussed
here.
In the following paragraph, a review of the draft bill in
relation to the Directive, containing the minimum stan-
dards set out by the European Court of Human Rights,
as far as the presence of the lawyer prior to, during, as
well as after police interrogation will be made.
87. Second draft Bill on implementing the EU-Directive 2013/48/EU (PbEU
L294), Art. 488b, para. 2.
88. Second draft Bill on implementing the EU-Directive 2013/48/EU (PbEU
L294), Art. 488c, para. 1.
89. Second draft Bill on implementing the EU-Directive 2013/48/EU (PbEU
L294), Art. 488c, para. 2.
90. Second draft Bill on implementing the EU-Directive 2013/48/EU (PbEU
L294), Art. 488c, para. 3.
91. Second draft Bill on implementing the EU-Directive 2013/48/EU (PbEU
L294), Art. 488c, para. 4.
92. Second draft Bill on implementing the EU-Directive 2013/48/EU (PbEU
L294), at 6.
93. Explanatory Memorandum 2nd draft Bill on implementing the EU-
Directive2013/48/EU (L 294), at 85.
4 Assessing the Second Dutch
Draft Bill
As mentioned earlier, the presence of a lawyer during
and prior to interrogation as a principle was not imme-
diately fully embraced by the Dutch legal authorities.
The approach towards the matter has always been met
with a strong reliance and confidence in the professional
approach by the judicial authorities, more in particular
the police force. This can be considered as one of the
reasons that the amendment of the regulation of the
interrogation has always been approached with the cur-
rent regulation as a starting point. In the following, the
second proposed Dutch draft bill will be compared to
the Directive as far as the presence of a lawyer prior to
and during police interrogation is concerned.
The demands set out in the first two articles of the
Directive, dealing with the objective and scope of this
Directive, seem to have been met in the draft bill.
Roughly spoken, the objective of the draft is to meet the
standards set out amongst others in the ruling of the
earlier mentioned case of Salduz v. Turkey as well as
Pishchalnikov v. Russia94 and Dayanan v. Turkey95 and
other cases96 dealing with the presence of a lawyer prior
to, during, and after police interrogation which means
prevention of ill-treatment as well as the earlier-
mentioned safeguarding of the fair trial, as meant in
Article 6 of the ECHR, as a whole. It needs to be
emphasised that the Directive sets minimum rules con-
cerning the rights of the suspects and accused persons in
criminal proceedings. Offering suspects or accused per-
sons more or more extended rights is not prohibited and
even encouraged.
The proposed amendment of the earlier proposed Arti-
cle 27c CPC97 requires that suspects are provided with
certain relevant information in criminal procedures.
The information provided is to be extended by the
amendment. If both proposals become law, it can be said
that the requirement of the Directive as to providing
information from the moment in time that the suspected
or accused person is made aware by the competent
authorities that he is suspected or accused of having
committed a criminal offence, irrespective of whether or
not his liberty is deprived, is met. This also goes for
persons who become a suspect during the questioning
by police or other law-enforcing authorities.
4.1 Right of Access to a Lawyer: The Draft Bill
and Articles 3 and 4 of the Directive
Articles 3 and 4, as mentioned above, require the
Member State to ensure the right of access to a lawyer
in such a time and manner allowing the person con-
cerned to exercise his rights of defence practically and
effectively. It seems that the Netherlands as a Member
94. ECHR 24 September 2009, Appl. No. 7025/04, Pishchalnikov v. Russia.
95. ECHR 13 October 2009, Appl. No. 7377/03, Dayanan v. Turkey.
96. ECHR 28 June 2001, Appl. No. 4429/09, Sebalj v. Croatia.
97. Above n. 58 and 61.
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State has tried to fulfil this requirement in the second
draft bill with the proposed Articles 28 till 28d CPC.
The proposed Article 28 CPC enables the suspect to
have access to one or more lawyers. These lawyers can
assist him in his case. The suspect who does not have a
lawyer is appointed one or, in special cases, more than
one. The suspect who does not have a chosen lawyer
shall be made aware of the possibility to have one
appointed. According to this article, the moment in time
at which the suspect or accused person shall be
informed about this right is after the arrest prior to his
interrogation by the assistant public prosecutor and pri-
or to the custody or demand of detention by the public
prosecutor or his assistant.
If any investigation is performed by the investigative
judge: at the first interrogation by him or the person
carrying out his orders of the investigative judge. In the
case of notification of appeal, the accused has to be
informed by the clerk.
The assistant public prosecutor informs the Council of
Legal Assistance in any case when a vulnerable suspect
is arrested, or an arrest made on the count of an offence
which is punishable with a sentence of twelve years or
more imprisonment or on the count of an offence for
which remand is allowed and the suspect did not chose a
lawyer but has made clear that he wants to make use of
his right to access one.
This article also appears to provide the possibility for
the suspect or accused person to exercise his rights laid
down in the Directive effectively and practically.
The proposed Article 28c CPC deals, as mentioned ear-
lier, with the contact between the lawyer and the suspect
or accused person. According to this article, the oppor-
tunity to communicate shall be given to the suspect with
his lawyer for half an hour prior to the first police inter-
rogation. This time limitation was already provided in
the first draft and demonstrates the, earlier mentioned,
perspective from which fulfilling the Directive’s
requirements is approached. Offering a suspect half an
hour to converse with his lawyer (usually both are unac-
quainted) seems to be a very narrow explanation of the
requirement set out in the Directive. The provision
answers to the demand that access to a lawyer prior to
police questioning is offered without undue delay; how-
ever, the question remains whether or not limiting the
time in which this right can be exercised can be regar-
ded as an effective and practical exercise of the right.
According to the ECtHR, the suspect has to obtain
effective legal assistance. This means, amongst others,
that the lawyer has to be able to discuss the case, to
organise the defence, to collect evidence in favour of his
client, to prepare him for questioning, and to support
him in his distress.98 In uncomplicated cases, the half-
hour limitation will probably not lead to any problems
in providing legal assistance. It leaves the suspect
enough time to discuss his case and the position he
should take. However, in more complex cases, this limi-
98. ECHR 13 October 2009, Appl. No. 7377/03, Dayanan v. Turkey, para.
32.
tation in time can be regarded as rather narrow to pro-
vide the legal assistance. Beyond efficiency, any legal
arguments for the limitation in time cannot be found.
Thus, it appears that this limitation might prejudice the
effective exercise and essence of the right involved.
The possibility to communicate with the lawyer prior to
the police interrogation can be refused when this can be
perceived as justified by one or more compelling rea-
sons.99 On the same grounds, a police interrogation can
start within the period of two hours, set to await the
arrival of the lawyer.100 The grounds of such a decision
have to be written down in the minutes of interrogation.
If disputed by the defence, the judge in the court case
will have to decide whether the decision was ill-found-
ed. Evidently not allowing communication prior to the
interrogation can prejudice the effective exercise of the
right of defence. However, the legal grounds on which
this decision can be grounded do not appear to threaten
this right in principle, only diversion or abuse of the
grounds seem to create a breach.
The first and third paragraphs of the proposed
Article 28d CPC state that the suspect shall be offered
the possibility to communicate with his lawyer as much
as possible, if he so desires and the lawyer is not present
during interrogation. If the lawyer is present at the
interrogation, he can participate. The suspect can
request to communicate with his lawyer in private. This
right corresponds with the required right in Article 3 of
the Directive, enabling the suspect or accused person to
meet in private and communicate with his representing
lawyer. The requests to communicate with his lawyer
can however under Dutch law be refused, as mentioned
above, if repeated requests disturb the order and pro-
gress of the interrogation. The memorandum explicitly
legitimates this power by mentioning that criminal
proceedings are best served by an uninterrupted
interrogation.101 It needs to be emphasised that from the
investigators' perspective, every request to communicate
in private with a lawyer in principle can be considered
as an interruption of the progress and order of the inter-
rogation. When the situation arises that the order and
progress of the interrogation is disturbed, it is initially
up to the deputy public prosecutor to decide. However,
the decision will be assessed by the judge in a later phase
of the process. If he rules with the decision not to allow
communication with a lawyer, there will be a breach of
the Directive. The investigative authorities thus need to
be very careful in assessing this component: the risk of
putting their own interest in first place when a request is
made by the suspect is rather big.
4.2 Presence of a Lawyer during Interrogation
Having a lawyer present during interrogation by the
police is regulated by the proposed Article 28d CP in
the draft bill. According to the article, the presence of a
lawyer during interrogation can be refused when this
99. Ibid., at 73.
100. Following the second draft Bill on implementing the EU-Directive
2013/48/EU (PbEU L294), Art. 28b, fourth paragraph, first sentence.
101. Ibid., at 78.
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can be perceived as justified by one or more compelling
reasons.102 When the investigative authorities feel that
an urgent necessity of the investigation prohibits the
presence of the lawyer during interrogation, the public
prosecutor shall be notified and the grounds on which
the urgent necessity is founded are recorded in the
minutes of the interrogation. Thus it is to the judge to
decide whether or not the refusal of the presence was ill-
founded if the defence states that this was the case.
In this aspect the second draft strongly deviates from
the first draft bill, which limited the presence of a
lawyer to severe cases.103 Prohibiting the presence of a
lawyer during interrogation is a breach of the right
expressed in Article 3 of the Directive. Limiting the
right of his presence to severe cases thus conflicted with
the requirement of the Directive. With the current pro-
posal, his presence can only be refused if an urgent
necessity to do so exists. In that respect the new draft
seems to meet the requirements of the Directive. Evi-
dently the authorities should restrain themselves in
exercising this power.104
4.3 Waiver
The possibility for the suspect or accused person to
waive his right to communicate with his lawyer prior to,
during, or after police interrogation is reflected in Arti-
cle 28a and Article 28c, third paragraph. Vulnerable sus-
pects or suspects arrested on the count of an offence,
punishable with a sentence of twelve years or more
imprisonment, can only waive this right after having
been informed by a lawyer of the consequences thereof.
Suspects that do not belong to these special categories
can waive the right voluntarily and unequivocally. They
shall not be informed by a lawyer but by a judge or
police officer of the consequences of waiving the right
and of the possibility that the decision to waiver this
right can be revoked. According to the Directive, a
waiver of this right can only be given after the suspect
or accused person is informed, orally or in writing,
about the content of this right and the possible conse-
quences of waiving it. Next to that, the waiver shall be
given voluntarily and unequivocally. The requirements
of the Directive as far as waivers are concerned appear
to have been fulfilled in this second draft. In the first
draft bill, informing the suspect of the consequences
thereof was limited to serious offences.105 Noting the
circumstances under which the waiver was given, the
other requirement of the Directive is supposed to be
already regulated. Next to that, the proposed
Article 28a, second paragraph of the CPC, instructs the
officer to report on the providing of information. How-
ever, it remains to be seen whether or not the existing
set of rules is sufficient. The Dutch Code of Criminal
Procedure has a general provision article, Article 152 of
102. Ibid., at 73.
103. A serious offence in the first draft was defined as an offence, punishable
with a sentence of six years imprisonment.
104. Other requirements of Art. 4 of the Directive are met by, amongst other
articles, Art. 218 CPC.
105. Ibid., at 104.
the CPC, obligating investigative clerks to note all of
their actions in writing. Whether or not the general pro-
vision together with the provision instructing to provide
information suffices to meet the requirement set out by
the Directive remains to be seen; no specific rules about
the registration of circumstances under which the
accused waivered its rights, as demanded by Article 9 of
the Directive, are laid down in the Dutch draft bill.
Until now, this general provision did not contribute to
the fact that records of interrogation contained a literal
reflection of questions asked during interrogation of a
suspect or accused person.106 Rule and practice will be
decisive for adequate implementation of the Directive.
4.4 Articles 5, 6, and 7 of the Directive
Articles 5, 6, and 7 will not be discussed in this paper
except for the fact that the Directive requires the Mem-
ber State to ensure that a suspect or accused person
deprived of his liberty, has the right to inform at least
one person of his deprivation of liberty without undue
delay if he wishes to do so. This paper, as stated before,
does not focus on this right; however, it should be noted
that when children are involved as a suspect or accused
person, the holder of parental responsibility is informed
of the deprivation of liberty and of the reasons thereto,
unless contrary to the interests of the child. This
requirement appears to be answered by Article 488b of
the Criminal Procedure Code ordering the assistant
public prosecutor to inform the parents or custodian of
the arrest of the minor as well as the Council for Child
Protection.
Articles 8 and 9 of the Directive, as mentioned earlier,
regard derogations and waivers. As a general rule, tem-
porary derogations can be made if they are proportion-
ate and do not go beyond what is necessary. Next to
that, they need to be strictly limited in time and not
solely based on the type or seriousness of the alleged
offence. Beyond these requirements, certain temporary
derogations have to be authorised by judicial authorities,
duly reasoned and open for submission to judicial
review. Other derogations need to be authorised by a
competent authority and open for submission to judicial
review. The Dutch draft bill contains a number of pos-
sibilities to derogate the rights of the suspects or
accused persons.
5 The Supreme Court Verdict
of 1 April 2014107
Before drawing conclusions, it needs to be pointed out
that the Supreme Court made a judgement on
1 April 2014, in other words, after the adoption of the
106. When the suspect or accused person uses his rights to remain silent,
officials' records of the interrogation quite often are limited to the men-
tioning of the duration of the interrogation, participants, and breaks
and the fact that the suspect or accused person remained silent. Ques-
tions that remained unanswered are not reported.
107. ECLI:NL:HR:2014:770.
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Directive, on the presence of a lawyer during police
interrogation. The defence complained about the use of
the statement of the suspect. This statement was made
without having consulted his lawyer prior to the inter-
rogation. He was however made aware of his right to
remain silent. The Supreme Court ruled that the
defence complaint on the use of the statement obtained
in violation of the Salduz rights had to be made in an
earlier stage of the legal proceedings and cannot be
made at first at the Supreme Court.
More interesting however is the ruling on the question
of the presence of a lawyer during interrogation. In his
conclusion the Attorney-General questions if not having
a lawyer present during the interrogation can still be
considered as justified with regard to the Navone case108
as well as the Directive.109 He concludes that this ques-
tion has to be answered in a negative way.110 The
Supreme Court however rules different. They argue
that the Directive has to be implemented in national leg-
islation on 27 November 2016111 which implicates that
no rights can be derived from the Directive until that
date. Next, they argue that the fact alone that a time
limit has been set for the Directive implies that legisla-
tion of a Member State does not have to comply with
the requirements, set out in the Directive, as is current-
ly applicable for the Netherlands.112 Then, the Supreme
Court ascertains that no legislation founded on the
Directive exists and stated that, bearing the political and
policy considerations as well as the organisational and
financial aspects in mind, creating a general regulation
regarding legal assistance during police interrogation
would exceed its judicial function. The fact that the
ECtHR in some cases ruled that the lack of legal assis-
tance meant a breach of Article 6 of the ECHR did not
change the approach to the judicial function of the
Supreme Court. According to the Supreme Court, the
cases of the ECtHR do not support the general conclu-
sions regarding the reach of the right to legal assistance
not to consequences of a breach thereof.113 The
Supreme Court however encourages the legislator to
have a dynamic approach to regulating this matter. This
encouragement is underlined by the remark that if legal
regulation does not come about, the rulings on the reach
and content of the right to legal assistance might be dif-
ferent.114
It appears that the approach of the Supreme Court is a
political one. This can be deducted from the fact that
the Supreme Court points out that their judicial func-
tion is too narrow to rule otherwise. Legally the
approach of the Directive not having entered into force
is correct. The same goes for the legal approach that the
108. Ibid., at 15.
109. In the Netherlands prior to a ruling, the Attorney-General at the
Supreme Court present his findings on the case in a so-called conclu-
sion.
110. ECLI:NL:PHR:2013:1424.
111. Ibid., at 16.
112. ECLI:NL:HR:2014:770, para. 2.5.2.
113. ECLI:NL:HR:2014:770, para. 2.5.3.
114. ECLI:NL:HR:2014:770, para. 2.5.4.
judgements of the ECtHR are too much bound by the
specific circumstances of the cases involved. With this
ruling, the Dutch Supreme Court places the ball in the
court of the Ministry of Security and Justice where it
has been since the Salduz judgement. This is emphasis-
ed by the encouragement to regulate this legally.
The Supreme Court has a justified argument to do so.
The Dutch State has shown a rather restrained
approach on implementing the Salduz judgement. It has
been short of six years since the ECtHR has judged in
the Salduz case, and in the meanwhile a Directive of the
European Union has been adopted. The Dutch State
however has not managed to implement legislation until
now. Legislation is still in the phase of a draft proposal.
6 Conclusion
In response to the rulings of the ECtHR in, amongst
others, but primarily, the case of Salduz v. Turkey, the
Dutch government saw an obligation to initiate a change
in Dutch criminal procedure on the traditionally rather
‘lean’ point of legal assistance and police interrogation.
It initiated legislation which resulted in a first draft bill
‘Legal assistance and police interrogation’ composed by
the Dutch Ministry of Security and Justice. The pro-
posed articles in the draft bill were rather lean in fulfill-
ing all the requirements resulting from the right to a fair
trial laid down in Article 6 of the ECHR. The margin of
appreciation was interpreted as rather wide by the
drafters of the draft bill and the question already arose
as to whether or not the criteria set out by the ECtHR
would be met by the draft bill. In May of 2013 the
European Union proposed a Directive containing mini-
mum rules relating to the right to access to a lawyer and
to communicate with him, which was adopted in
November of that same year. This Directive, unlike the
verdicts of the ECtHR, leaves a more narrow margin of
appreciation to the Member States since the rules are
not to be deducted from verdicts explaining the right to
a fair trial but are explicitly laid down in the provisions.
Following the Directive, the first draft was withdrawn
and two separate draft bills were proposed. One
focussed on implementing the elements necessary to
comply with the Directive, the other with a focus on
changing the regulations on the first phase of the
criminal investigation. The aim of this paper was to
study whether or not the draft bill, with a focus on
implementing elements necessary to comply with the
standards of that Directive, actually achieves that goal.
The Directive sets out a number of minimum rules
which Member States have to apply in the national leg-
islation. One of those minimum rules is the right of
access to a lawyer at the police interrogation. This mini-
mum right is answered by the second Dutch draft bill in
allowing the suspects or accused persons to discuss his
position and be provided with information during a time
period of half an hour. During the interrogation itself,
the lawyer is allowed to be present. This appears to
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meet the requirements made by the Directive although
the limitation in the draft bill to converse with a lawyer
still represents the Dutch point of view on inter-
rogation. The interest of a good ordered and regulated
interrogation appears to prevail and could probably be
conflicting with the point of view of the ECtHR in
explaining Article 6 of the ECHR. We must fear that
the reluctant tradition under Dutch law will not support
an open and effective interpretation nor create an exten-
sive practice.
It is understandable that the drafters of the Dutch draft
bill kept the process of the interrogation as central point
of view in the proposal because it has since long time
been the tradition in the Netherlands to have a strong
reliance on the professionalism and integrity of the
Dutch police. It appears that the drafters took the rul-
ings of the Strasbourg Court, explaining Article 6 of the
ECHR, as far as legal assistance is concerned too lightly.
The Supreme Court made a political choice by not
immediately condemning the current approach of inter-
rogation by stating that the Directive is, as such, not yet
legally binding and judgement of the ECtHR are too
much based on specific cases. Progress however is
required. A new draft already had to be made. The cur-
rent draft fortunately leaves less space for interpretation.
It remains to be seen whether or not this new draft will
enter into force without amendments. Time is running
out however: the countdown for the change in Dutch
law and – traditionally rather different – practice has
started and ends on 27 November 2016. And even if the
law is accepted, the ECtHR will control the application
in concrete cases on the basis of Article 6 as ‘living
instrument’! The topic is to be continued in the coming
years!
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